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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

JOHN W. SPENCER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

C~se

No. 8538

L. C. CROWTHER, et al,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF CASE
Under date of ~I a)' 29, 1951, the plaintiff, then a
police officer in the Police Department of Salt Lake
City, was discharged from the Police Department for
the reason that he was not a bona fide resident of Salt
Lake City. He appealed such discharge to the Civil Service Commission on l\f.ay 31, 1951. On June 8, 1951, pursuant to a directive of the Civil Service Commission, the
defendant Chief of Police Crowther filed a complaint
with the commission specifying as ground for discharge
that plaintiff was not a resident of Salt Lake City as
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required by Section 15-6-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
now Section 10-6-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and so
was ineligible to hold office ~s a police officer.
On November 1, 1951, plaintiff requested a hearing
before the Civil Service Commission, which request was
denied. rrhe denial of a hearing came about because in
another identical case involving another officer the
District Court of Salt Lake County had held that the
Civil Service Commission did not have jurisdiction to
entertain an appeal from a discharge based upon the
failure of an officer to maintain residence in the City
and that only the courts could adjudicate that matter.
X othing more was done until ::\Iay 1, 1953, eighteen
nwnths later, when plaintiff filed thi.s action, seeking
reinstatement and compensation from June 1, 1951. The
complaint recites the foregoing facts except the reason
for the commission denying plaintiff's request for a
hearing. The defendants filed a 1notion to dismiss on
the following grounds:
1. That the Complaint failed to state a claim.
2. That the court lacked jurisdiction of the subject 1natter, as being cognizable only by the
Civil Se1Tice Connnission.
3. That plaintiff was guilty of laches.
This 1notion wa~ denied.
Defendants fih~d answers on June 9, 1953, as the
nwtt<'r w.a~ set for trial before Judge :~\[artin l\L Larson.
-:\ o trial wa~ held, howeyer, and the Iuatter was permitted to go dormant for another two years, when an
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amended complaint was filed August 17, 1955, to bring
in a newly elected City Commissioner and two new members of the Civil Service Commission. On August 4, 1955,
defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 41 (b)
for failure to prosecute, more than two years having
elapsed since the filing of defendants' answer. This
motion was denied August 11, 1955, upon plaintiff agreeing to waive all salary due him since June, 1953, and
defendants' answer should stand as to the amended
complaint. Demand wa.s then made for trial and the
case was tried on l\iarch 27, 1956, nearly five years from
the date of discharge.
The trial court found the facts to be in substance
as follows: That plaintiff, since 1938 to June 1, 1951,
vv.as employed by Salt Lake Crty as a police officer,
third grade, subject to the rules and regulations of the
Civil Service Commission of Salt Lake City; that on
1\fay 29, 1951, the Chief of Police, L. C. Crowther, served
written notice of discharge upon plaintiff, specifying
that he was removed from the pay roll until such time
as he became .a bona fide resident of Salt Lake City;
that plaintiff appealed from said order to the Civil Service Commission of Salt Lake City; that a complaint was
filed with said Commission by the Chief; that thereafter,
by arrangement with the Chief of Police and the Civil
Service Commission, plaintiff was given until September
4, 1951, in which to move back into Salt Lake C:i t~r as a
resident thereof; that plaintiff on said date informed the
Civil Service Commission he had decided not to move
back into the City and thereupon his name was removed
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from the classified Civil Service rolls· that on November
1, 1951 plaintiff requested a hearing' before the ComJnission and such request was denied and his appeal to
the Commission dismissed; that thereafter plaintiff
brought this action; that plaintiff was not on May 29,
1951, or on June 1, 1951, nor had he been for several
years prior thereto, and was not thereafter during the
remainder of 1951, a qualified resident and elector of
Salt Lake City, but during all of said time plaintiff was
a resident of Salt Lake County outside the lin;rits of
Salt Lake City and so was ineligible to hold office as
a police officer of Salt Lake City. Judgment was
entered dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
STATEl\{ENT OF FACTS
The appellant's stateinent of facts is so sketchy that
we deem it necessary to 1nake a detailed statement. The
page references are to the record page numbers.
Plaintiff's fan1ily consists of himself, his wife aml
~on, 13 years of ag-e (p. 66). He becrune a 1nember of the
Ralt Lake Cit~~ Police Deparhnent in 1938. He and hi8
fmnily moved fron1 :2()-1-(1 Beverly Street. in Salt Lake
Cit~·. to a home in the county, located at :2111 \Yalker
Lane in the ~pring- of 1!1-1-8 because of his boy's health
( p. fiS- p. G9). In 1950 he was adYised by the Chief that
he wonld have to be a resident of Salt Lake City (p. 69).
He then left his family at \Y.alker Lane and rented a
r·oom at :w-1- J1Jast 6th South in Salt Lake City and stayed
there ahont ~ix werks, paying $20.00 a 1nonth. He then
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moved in with his brother, Clyde, at Fairmont Apartments, paying him as high as $20.00 per month (p. 74,
84). This apartment consisted of .a kitchen, a living room,
a bedroom, bath and sleeping porch (p. 103). Plaintiff
slept on the sleeping porch and stayed there until December, 1950 (p. 75). Then he rented a room at 823 Elm
Avenue with his aunt for $25.00 per month and stayed
there until June, 1951. From there he went back to the
vValker Lane residence about a week after his discharge
from the police department. He and his family lived
there until July 1, 1952, when they all moved to 2731
Fillmore Street in Salt Lake City where he has since
resided (p. 78).
He was registered and voted in District No. 68 in
Salt Lake City in 1942 to 1948, inclusive, his residence
being given as 2646 Beverly Street. Notwithstanding
he moved to Walker L.ane in the spring of 1948 he nevertheless voted that fall in District No. 68. He registered
in 1950 at the Fairmont Apartments but apparently did
not vote that year (Exhibit 1).
1

During the time he stayed at Sixth South, Fairmount Apartments and Elm Street he had his work
clothes with him. His other clothes were at vV alker
Lane. He h.ad no cooking utensils with him and no furniture except a bed and bedding while staying at Fairmont
Apartments. This he returned to Walker Lane when he
went to Elm Street. Neither his wife nor boy ever stayed
with him at Sixth South, Fairmont Apartments or Elm
Street. His wife prepared no meals for him there. All
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this time his wife and boy lived at Walker Lane. He
would go home to Walker Lane practically every day
while he was staying at Fairmont Apartments and Elm
Street, and would sometimes stay there overnight. He
had his meals there when he was there. Upon getting
his notice of discharge on May 29, 1951, he went back
to Walker Lane within a week (p. 83 to p. 87). Except
for the ban on living outside of the city he would have
lived at \Valker Lane all of 1951 (p. 90).
He and his wife were not estranged. His boy
attended school in the county and gave his home addres:;
as 2111 Walker Lane. Plaintiff gave his name as parent
and address at the same place. All groceries purchased
were for the \V alker Lane home. Plaintiff worked in the
yard there, made repairs, had his laundry done there
(p. 92-p. 93).
Plaintiff answered certain interrogatories propounded by defendants and these answers were introduced in evidence (p. 94). The interrogatories are found
in the record at page 15 and the answers at page ~S. From
these answers appear the following facts: The electrical
:-;PITicP for 2111 "\YalkPr Lane was applied for in hi~
nmne and was IH'n'r changed. The gas seiTice \Ya~
applied for in his wife's nmne and was neYer changed.
II is :-;on attended the Oakwood School during the school
yPar:-; of 19-!8-19-!9, 19-!9-1950, 1950-1951. He attended
Highland Park School in the school year of 1951-195~.
Pia inti l'l''s address given thP sehool authorities was ~111
Walker Lane during all of the ye.ars his son attended
tlw Oakwood School. On his lTtal1 Inc01ne tax returns
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for the years 1949, 1950 and 1951, plaintiff gave his
address as 2111 Walker Lane.
The mail box at 2111 \V alker Lane had the N.ame
"J. W. Spencer" on it (p. 131). Lt. vVilliam Heninger
testified that it was common knowledge that both he and
the plaintiff lived in the county and that a few days
before the service of the discharge order on l\1ay 29,
1951, he advised plaintiff to move into the city but
plaintiff replied with considerable heat that he would
not move into the city (p. 128).
It further appears from the testin1ony of Chief
Crowther and Calvin Behle, who was chairman of the
Civil Service Commission, that the Civil Service Commission attempted to settle the matter by getting plaintiff to move back into the city and then be given reinstatement. A meeting with plaintiff, his attorney, the Chief,
l\fr. Behle and counsel for the City was held July 9, 1951.
It was there .agreed that plaintiff should have a reasonable time to move into the city and be reinstated. The
time was extended to just after Labor Day. See testimony of Crowther (p. 114-18) and Behle (p. 121-22).
l\fr. Behle further testified that plaintiff's attorney
informed him that plaintiff had decided not to sell his
home and would not move into the city. Because of this
decision by plaintiff, and the f.act that the District Court
in a companion case brought h,v Edward Jackson had
held that the Civil Service Commission had no jurisdiction arising out of a discharge because of rc>~idence outside the city, the case before the Commission was closed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
(p. 123). The minutes of the Civil Service Commission,
Exhibit 7, show the sequence of events, the July 9th
meeting, the extension of time to move into the City to
September 4, 1951, the decision of plaintiff not to move
back into the City and the denial of plaintiff's request
for a hearing before the Commission and dismissal of
his appeal by the Commission on November 1, 1951.
X otice of this dismissal was served upon plaintiff under
date of November 2, 1951, as shown by Exhibit 12.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFF WAS BARRED BY LACHES TO MAINTAIN
THIS ACTION.
POINT III.
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE DILIGENTLY.
POINT IV.
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE COURT'S FINDING
AND CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A RESIDENT OF SALT LAKE CITY AT THE TIME OF HIS REMOVAL FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT.
POINT V.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING AND
ADJUDGING PLAINTIFF WAS LAWFULLY DISMISSED
FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER.

The record shows that in the spring of 1950 the
Chief of Police issued a regulation that all officers must
be bona fide residents of S.alt Lake City. See Exhibit 8
and plaintiff's testimony page (69). This was in harmony
with the provisions of 10-6-6, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, which reads :
"No person shall be eligible to any office,
elective or appointive, who is not a qualified elector of the city or town."
Holding office while ineligible would be a violation
of this statute and would constitute misconduct and
incompetency under the rules ,and regulations of the
Civil Service Commission. Section 4-1 of these rules
and regulations, page 48 of Exhibit 10, provides for
removal from office for "misconduct, incompetency or
failure to perform their duties or failure to observe
properly the rules of the department wherein they are
employed." Section 4-2 defines misconduct, among other
things, as (a) "violation of the laws of the State of Utah
relating to the conduct and authority of the employee
charged;" (d) "failure to properly observe the rules and
regulations of the Civil Service Commission." Section
4-5, page 50, defines failure to observe rules "disobediency of the orders of a superior officer or the general
orders and rules of the department where employed.''
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Plaintiff was discharged for failure to observe these
regulations which are based upon the above statutory
provision which makes him ineligible to hold office.
Plaintiff appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The
Chief of Police filed his complaint against plaintiff
with that commission. The appeal was taken pursuant
to section 10-10-21, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Under
the terms of that section jurisdiction to pass upon the
rightfulness of the discharge is vested solely in the Civil
Service Commission and its decision thereon is final.
We respectfully submit that a discharge based upon
non-residence comes within the terms of the above referred to section which, by its terms, empowers the head
of the department to remove a person for misconduct,
incompetency or failure to perform his duties or failure
to observe properly the rules of the department. If such
dereliction does not cmne within the purview of this
language then there would be no power in the chief to
remove an officer for that cause.

~\

suit would have to

he conunenced by smneone in the nature of quo warranto
·to

te~t

the officer's right to hold office when he does not

re~ide

within the eity. 'Ye sub1nit the legislature did
not intend such a result. The question of jurisdiction
1nay be raised at any tin1e and may be raised sua sponte
hy t liP eourt itself. -! c..T.~ .• Sec. -!;). p. l~S: Oldroyd r .
.1/ cC rea, 65 {I tah 1-t~, ~;~;) P. 580.
Our nwtion to disn1iss for lack of jurisdiction should
have been sustained.
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POINT II.

PLAINTIFF WAS BARRED BY LACHES TO MAINTAIN
THIS ACTION.

This action was not commenced until May 1, 1953,
23 months after the effective date of the discharge and
18 months after the denial by the Civil Service Commission of plaintiff's appeal to that body. There is
nothing in the complaint to explain or excuse such delay.
In .a case of this kind, involving a public office, the
burden was on plaintiff to allege facts showing due diligence. City of Indiana vs. State) 70 N.E. 2d, 635. See
also State vs. District Court) 74 P. 497 One who seeks to
compel his reinstatement to a civil service position must
act promptly or be guilty of laches; Hayman vs. City of
Los Angeles) 62 P. 2d 1049; Hicks vs. City of Los
Angeles) J82 P. 2d 1046; 35 Am. Jur. Section 312,

Page 65.
In 145 A.L.R. 767, this question of laches and acquiescence is extensively .annotated. Cases are there collected which hold a delay of 18 months, one year, 15
months, 14 months, 10 months, 6 months, and so on,
is sufficient to bar an action because of laches. Cases
involving police officers are found on Page 779. See
also Corcoran vs. City of Los Angeles, 289 P 2<1 556.
We submit that our motion to dismiss on the ground of
laches should have been sustained.
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POINT III.
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR
F AlLURE TO PROSECUTE DILIGENTLY.

Defendants filed their answer to plaintiff's complaint on June 9, 1953. The case was set to be tried in
June of 1953. No trial was held although defendants
were prepared for trial. On July 6, 1955, more than two
years later, the plaintiff filed a motion to file an amended
complaint, as in the meantime changes had occurred in
the personnel of the City Commission and the Civil Servive Commission. This motion was heard August 11th at
which time defendants moved to dismiss for failure to
prosecute diligently under rule 41 (b), rtah Rules of
Civil Procedure. The court denied this motion. We submit that the same considerations that make laches a bar
to this kind of an action also require diligent prosecution
by the plaintiff. Plaintiff's action should have been dismissed.
POINT IV.
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE COURT'S FINDING
AND CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A RESIDENT OF SALT LAKE CITY AT THE TIME OF HIS REMOVAL FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT.

Section 10-6-6 has been quoted heretofore. Seetion
20-:2-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides as follows:
'•A resident within the 111eaning of this title
is a person who has resided or v~rill haYe resided
continuously within this state for one year, and
in the eounty four 1nonth, and in the precinct sixty
rla~'f' next preceding the day of the next ensuing
election."
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The pertinent parts of Section 20-2-14, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 read as follows:
(1) "That place must be considered and held to
be the residence of a person in which his habitation is fixed, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning."
(8) "The place where a man's family resides is
presumed to be his place of residence, but any
man who takes up or continues his abode with the
intention of remaining at a place other than where
his family resides must be regarded as a resident
where he so resides."
(9) "A change of residence can only be made
by the act of removal joined with the intent to remain in another place. There can only be but
one residence. A residence cannot be lost until
another is gained."
Eligibility to office must continue while J1nlrFro:
office and this rule applies to a police officer. In State
vs. Shores, 48 Utah 76, 157 P. 225, the court construed
Section 221 C.L. 1907, now Section 10-6-6, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, and held that a police officer is an
officer within that statute and that the word "eligible"
means "capability of being legally chosen, and related
to the legal capacity of being appointed, elected or chosen,
as well as holding." That the word "eligible" means capable of holding an office is also held by the following
cases: People vs. Leonard, 73 Cal. 230, 14 P. 853; State
vs. Clarke, 3 Nev. 556; Helwig vs. PayJic, 194 Cal. 524,
2-H P. 884; State ex rel Summerfield vs. Clarke, 21 Nev.
:333, 31 p. 545.
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Residence under the election statutes means domicile
and not mere physical presence at a place. In Beauregard
vs. Gunnison City, 48 Utah 515,160 P. 815, the court says:
"The domicile of a married man is presumed
to be at the place where his wife or family resides.
If Mrs. Knighton lived, that is, was domiciled in
voting district No. 1, the presumption is that her
husband also lived there, and the presumption
would prevail until the contrary is shown.''

State vs. Savre, 129 Iowa 122, 105 X.W. 387, 3
L.R.A.N.S. 455, holds that the "word 'residence,' as employed in the election statutes is synonomous with 'home,'
or 'domicile' and means a fixed or permanent abode
or habitation to which the party, when absent, intends
to return. Ordinarly little difficulty is experienced in
determining the residence of a man with a family, for
it is, save in exceptional cases, where the family lives
or has their home."
In State YS. Atti, 21 A. :?d 603, where defendant was
convicted of voting in a district in which he was not .a
resident, the court says:

"A person may have n1ore than one residence
but may not have n1ore than one domicile. His
permanent home is his dmnicile and the place of
his domicile detern1ines his right to vote."
also 18 Am. J 11 r .. See. 5+, page 216, Annotated
ca~P~ 1915 C. 7~1:.?: naris Estate, 43 P. 2d 115: Te.ras YS.
Florida, S;) L. ed. 117!).
RPP

The llH'l"<' faet that plaintiff registered in 1950 from
tiH' Fairnwnt ApartmPnt~ does not establish that place
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as his residence. Such action on the part of plaintiff
cannot outweigh the facts established by the evidence
that his home or domicile was at 2111 "\Valker Lane, to
which place he returned as often as he could and at
which place he would have stayed except for the requirement that he be a resident of the city and to which place
he always intended to go and to which he did go. The
facts in this case as outlined in our statement of the
case are much similar to those in Goldfeter vs. H efferman, 99 N.Y.S. 2d 959, where one Hall registered in
one district and the facts pointed to the conclusion that
his real residence or domicile was in .another district.
The case of In Re Stabile, 348 Pa. 587, 36 A. 2d 451,
is a case where the facts are in every respect similar
to those in the instant case. This was an action to strike
Stabile's name from the register of voters in the 8th
District of the Third Ward of Pittsburg. The facts .are
these. He owned a dwelling house at 1306 Bedford
Avenue in that district and ward, having 8 rooms, 4 being
bedrooms. James Suriano, his wife, and four children
lived there, rent free, and the utilities were in Suriano's
name. Here Stabile had lived .all his life up to 1930,
and he still claims it as his legal residence. He always
voted from this residence and from no other. In 1930 he
bought another residence in Mt. Lebanon, where his children lived practically all the time. 1-Ie has domestic help
there but not at the Bedford Street residence. l\1rs. Suriano manages the latter home and Stabile and his wife
are privileged to sleep, dine and entertain in that home
whenever they choose so to do. He testified he stayed
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two or three nights a week at Bedford A venue, sometimes
a whole week, sometimes longer. His children stay there
once in awhile; his clothes are at Mt. Lebanon, his children go to school at 1ft. Lebanon; sometimes he slept at
M:t. Lebanon. Mrs. Stabile te~tified all the groceries she
bought were for the Mt. Lebanon home; they had no
cooking utensils at the Bedford Street address; when
she has a family dinner it is held at l\I t. Lebanon. Sometimes she eats meals with her husband at the :\It. Lebanon address.
The court .says:
"It is clear from the reading of this record
that Stabile's home, i.e., his legal residence, is
in 1\It. Lebanon and that since 1930 he has attempted to maintain a 'voting residence' at 1306
Bedford Avenue, Pittsburgh. The act of June 3,
1937, P.L. 1333, Sec. 704, 25 P.S. Sec. 2814, declares that 'the place where the family of a married man or woman resides shall be considered
and held to be his or her place of residence, except
where the husband and wife have actually separated and live apart * * *.' Stabile and his wife
have not separated and do not live apart. They
and their family are a unit and their only family
home is in l\f t. Lebanon. Stabile calls his Mt.
Lebanon h01ne his 'sununer h01ne,' but his three
children reside there all the year around and go
to school from that h01ne. There is the only place
where this family 'keeps house, • as Mrs. Stabile's
te.stimony indicates. The 'Re-Staten1ent of Conflict of Laws,' Sec. 13, declares as follows: 'A
home i ~ a dwelling plare of a person, distinguished
from other dwelling places of that person by the
intimacy of the relation between the person and
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the place.' Sec. 13, comment g., '\Vhen a person
has his family living with him in a dwelling-place,
it is strong evidence that the dwelling-place is his
home.' By every test laid down by the law this
appellant's home in Mt. Lebanon Township is his
legal residence.
"The courts have never accepted the contention sometimes made that a man's legal residence is wherever he says it is or where he says
he intends it to be. An individual's legal residence
is a question of fact which the state has .a paramount interest in determining. A voter can vote
only where his legal residence is; he can hold
public office only if he resides in the political
division his office serves."

* * * *
"Residence indicates permanency of abode as
distinct from mere lodging or boarding. One of
the rules for determining a person's residence, as
prescribed in Sec. 704 (a) of the Election Code
of 1937, 25 P.S. Chap. 2814 (.a), supra, is the
following: 'That place shall be considered the
residence of a person in which his habitation is
fixed, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has
the intention of returning.'
"No one reading this record can doubt that
the place to which Stabile 'intends to return'
when he is away from home is the place in Mt.
Lebanon where his wife, with the aid of a servant,
keeps house and where his three young children
sleep and eat and have practically all their existence, except for a few hours five days a week
when they .are in school. There and not to the
Suriano home in Pittsburgh is where he goes when
he returns from his labors, to the 'bosom of his
family.' That is his home and his home is his
legal residence."
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As stated in State vs. Savre, supra, "a person cannot
live in one place and by force of imagination constitute
some other his place of abode." It is quite significant
that plaintiff did not call his wife to testify. If anyone
would know that plaintiff had established a domicile
separate from her and her family she would.
We have not attempted to re-state the evidence
under this heading, as we feel that statement of facts
as made sufficiently shows that this case is in all respects
within the facts and rules of law set out in the Stabile
and Goldfetter cases, supra.
\V e submit that under the facts contained in the
record there is ample evidence to sustain the court's
finding of fact that plaintiff was not a resident of Salt
Lake City at the time of his removal fr01n the police
department. That finding may not be disturbed if there
is evidence to sustain it. \Y e go further and assert, the
court could not, upon tllis record have found otherwise.
POINT V.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING AND
ADJUDGING PLAINTIFF WAS LAWFULLY DISMISSED
FROM THE POLICE DEPARTMENT.

Since the record mnply sustains the finding that
plaintiff wa~ not a resident of Salt Lake City at the
tim<' of hi~ n'moyal. the conc.lusion of law'" follows that he
wn~ lawl'ull.Y di~eharged fr01n the polic.e department.
liP could 11ot hold officP in that deparhnent if ineligible.
h'~fale v~. ~"-Nwrcs ......·upra, and cases c.ited under Point-!.
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Furthermore, he was in violation of the rules of the department and the rules and regulations of the Civil
Service Commission as pointed out in Point I.
CONCLUSION
The record is clear that plaintiff's atte.mpt to establish a residence in Salt Lake City, while his family resided outside the city .at the vValker Lane dwelling was
wholly specious. Under the .statute he could have only
one residence and under this record that was where his
family lived. Not being a resident of Salt Lake City, he
became ineligible to hold office as a police officer of
that city. He was in direct violation of the regulation of
the department that he must be a resident of Salt Lake
City. This rendered him incompetent to discharge the
duties of a police officer and constituted misconduct as
well. We re·spectfully submitt that plaintiff's action
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, laches and
failure prosecute diligently, or that the judgment of the
trial court dismissing plaintiff's action should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CHRISTENSEN
City Attorney
HOMER HOLMGREN
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents
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